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 بوتكم ةتفلا عضنو اهباوبا لفقنس ،ايروس يف برحلا يهتنت امدنع( :يلع)لوخدلا عونمم، 
 يكبنس اندحو اننازحا انشع امك اندحول احرف. 
 
 
A note found in a Syrian boy’s diary: 
“When the war is over in my country, we will close Syria’s doors and we will put a banner that says: (No Entry). We will 
shed tears of joy alone, just like how we suffered our grief alone.” 
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Abstract 
The goal of this paper is to assess US policy toward the Syrian civil war. Above all, it will seek to show 
how the Obama foreign policy has contributed to the rise of ISIS in Syria. It will argue that the Obama 
administration lost an opportunity to promote democracy, which in turn could have played more into 
US hands. This thesis looks at the relationship between the US and its allies, and also seek to explain 
the reason behind US intervention in Libya, and the US stance during the uprising in Egypt.  As such this 
paper mainly focus on the Arab Spring and the US response. It concludes that the Obama Foreign policy 
toward Syria was a failure, as it did not safeguard US interests, rather the contrary. Its inaction has 
fuelled resentment in a country marked by the violence of its regime, paving the way for ISIS rise and 
continuation for the decades to come to be the epicentre of global terrorism.
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Abbreviations & Acronyms 
ACD: ARMED CONFLICT DATABASE 
FP: FOREIGN POLICY 
IISS: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 
ISIS / DAESH: ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND SYRIA 
USA: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
YPG: YEKÎNEYÊN PARASTINA GEL (KURDISH) 
FP: FOREIGN POLICY 
 
I. Introduction 
The civil war in Syria started in 2011 with peaceful demonstrations taking place in 
different cities of the country. Protestors were calling for more democratic rights. Soon, the 
regime responded with violence. The protests escalated to a high degree of violence, plunging 
the country into a civil war. The international community condemned the violence without any 
significant results. The US, France and the UK condemned the Regime for its human rights 
abuses, and tried to half-hearted influence the regime in favour of the opposition. Soon, new 
actors appeared in the civil war advocating for a very strict and warped reading of Islam. Some 
of these groups are considered by the West as a threat to their national security and the region 
stability. This paper has for ambition to highlight the link that exists between the rise of the 
Islamic State, and the US administration failure to properly address the crisis. In order to do so, 
after having reviewed the literature addressing US Foreign Policy (FP) toward Syria and ISIS, 
Chapter III will seek establish the international context and highlight the different approaches 
the US administration has taken to address the Arab Spring and regarding its allies. It will then 
look at the options the administration could have contemplated in order to attain its objectives. 
Chapter IV to provide some insight on the way the ISIS has been able to establish itself in Syria, 
and how it has impacted the Syrian opposition groups. A last chapter (V) will then discuss the 
mistakes of the administration and the consequences for the r. It will address the issue of 
democracy in Syria and the Obama's view on interventionism. The devastating effects of its red 
line on the Syrian opposition, combined with his reluctance to provide sufficient lethal materials 
to the rebels will be examined. Then this paper will conclude (VI) that Obama had made a 
wrong assessment of the Syrian crisis, contemplated military intervention half-hearted, and 
wrongly saw the civil war through the lens of its relations with Iran and Russia. 
The literature available on the Syrian conflict is vast, but as the conflict is relatively recent 
most of the literature revolve around human right abuses, the refugee crisis, the regime strategy, 
and the impact of the crisis on regional politics. Very few articles analyse a possible link 
between the West failure to take significant actions in Syria and the rise of extremist groups 
challenging the status quo in the area.  
As the author of this thesis has also worked on a dissertation addressing the relationship 
between the rise of ISIS and the regime’s policy1, some of the assumptions drawn from the 
conclusions made in the previous paper will be used for this thesis. The first conclusion was 
that in its fight against the uprising, the regime has been ignoring, likely on purpose, ISIS for 
months which in turn was able to take control over large portions of territory. The regime used 
                                                          
1 “Is Assad an ally in the fight against ISIS?” can be retrieved at https://1drv.ms/b/s!Apcd1hhhAsexi-
ZdNsHco2B6iNutrg  
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an extreme degree of violence in order to maintain itself in power and focused its strikes mainly 
on democratic forces, the biggest threat to the regime due to its own lack of legitimacy. As a 
result, this will not contemplate the Regime as a solution to the conflict. 
II. Literature Review & Methodology 
Recent debates in the literature over the Obama foreign policy efficiency in Syria 
highlight a fundamental disagreement between researchers and commentators. One side argues 
that the Obama administration should have done more and acted more quickly in Syria to stop 
its descent into hell, while the other is arguing that its policy of restraint was effective in 
reducing US involvement in the region, which would in turn reduce long-term engagement of 
the US in the Middle East. Fundamentally, it could be argued that this disagreement takes its 
origin in the opposition of the interventionist and isolationist views. 
Some authors have highlighted the potential benefits of the Arab Spring for American 
interests (David & Goldberg, 2013). If countries subject to it took a liberal turn by overthrowing 
authoritarian regimes in favour of democratic ones, the Middle East would cease to be the 
enormous source of concerns as it has been the case for the last decades, with its tensions linked 
to states’ security (the Israeli-Arabs relations, nuclear proliferation, flow of oil) decreasing 
(David & Goldberg, 2013; Indyk, et al., 2012, p. 14). Furthermore, Struye de Swielande & 
Daelman notes that the roots cause of the rise of ISIS lays in the failure of states to provide 
what ISIS promises: basic public services such as healthcare, education and security, and those 
issues reflecting the lack of accountability of these autocratic regimes (Struye de Swielande & 
Daelman, 2015, p. 71).  
Others have shared their scepticism about this liberal idealism. Even David & Goldberg 
balances the issue of lack of representativeness by pointing out that this could also apply to 
Saudi Arabia. As the biggest oil producer and long-time US ally, if civil war was to break up 
in the country, regarding the central role the country plays in the world economy, this would 
pose a major challenge to the post-Cold War world order (David & Goldberg, 2013, pp. 261, 
262). Whether democracy prevails or not in Syria, the cost and difficulty of reconstruction as 
the civil war prolongs could lead to decades of instability (Sorenson, 2013, p. 6). As a result, in 
order to limit long-term instability, the administration opted for a four-part strategy consisting 
in backing UN resolutions, counterterrorism operations and humanitarian aid (Strategic 
Comments, 2017).Therefore, there is a clear disagreement in the literature over the potential 
outcome of democracy in Syria for the overall region. Sorenson sought to settle the matter by 
pointing out the lack of relevance of this ideal in the middle of the chaos. 
In assessing the response of the administration at the beginning of the crisis, some 
researchers pose the question whether the administration had well appreciated the scope of the 
stakes involved in the Syrian uprising. For Bahout, while the Syrian crisis was a major 
development for Obama’s second term, the administration failed to properly assess the 
importance of this crisis (Bahout, 2016, p. 85). Rather than considering the Syrian roots of the 
crisis, the administration defined its policy in Syria in terms of its policy toward Iran, Russia or 
Turkey (Bahout, 2016, p. 86; Smith, 2014, p. 6), and its will to withdraw from the Middle East 
(Bahout, 2016, p. 86). Bahout goes as far as arguing that at the beginning, its policy toward the 
Syrian conflict was close to be summed up in two words: “doing nothing” (Bahout, 2016, p. 
86). Indeed, Lee argues that Obama tried to prioritise the stabilisation of the relations between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, which relationship was considered by Obama as toxic (Smith, 2014, p. 
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7). As a result, for the administration, the interests the US had in trying to shape the outcome 
of the Syrian Civil War were very limited.  
Juneau justifies this policy by arguing that given that the ISIS does not pose an 
existential threat to the US, a more isolationist approach would avoid the US to get involved 
into a long-term entanglement, and is reasonable in terms of costs if compared to the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The author also argues that if the ISIS poses an important threat the US 
interests, they are nonetheless not vital (Juneau, 2015, p. 38). There are also other domestic 
challenges the administration was facing, which implied a focus of the administration on the 
issues at home (nation-building at home) and a minimalist approach to foreign affairs (Nardon, 
2013; Struye de Swielande & Daelman, 2015, p. 72). In order to avoid long-term entanglement, 
the US should refrain from sending US troops and instead rely on local partners to take 
responsibilities over the fight on the ground, and favouring a “light footprint” approach (Juneau, 
2015, p. 38; Struye de Swielande & Daelman, 2015, p. 76; Smith, 2014). Following this line, 
Allin argues that if the moral issue in Syria was huge, the US should nonetheless refrain from 
engaging in an asymmetrical conflict where “its interests are insufficient to justify a prolonged 
commitment” (Allin, 2014, p. 171) 
Some researchers in the literature have warned about the temptation to adopt a dogmatic 
reading of the field. Consequently, Ahmad brings in a contrasting view regarding moral 
argument to the debate: as Syria became a killing field, as such looking away becomes immoral 
and “strategically disastrous” (Ahmad, 2013, p. 47). He highlights the divide between the 
interventionists and isolationists, with the latter view becoming widespread due to the fatigue 
of the US public toward humanitarian intervention, which has been used to justify wars based 
on geo-strategic motivations (Ahmad, 2013, p. 47). As a result, the regime’s argument of the 
Syrian rebellion being orchestrated by external actors against a sovereign regime is echoed by 
the anti-imperialist left and anti-war libertarian right (Ahmad, 2013, p. 47). By doing so, he 
warns about the systematic opposition to the use of force abroad as a matter dogma, rather than 
a matter of facts. For example, Khashanah, departing from the interests of the US could have 
in destabilising the country, argues that the US have orchestrated the uprising (Khashanah, 
2014). In doing so, this author completely rejects the idea of a lack of involvement of the US 
in the crisis, and rather paints the US as the main originator of the uprising. Without making 
value-judgements, it is worth noting that if this view is widespread in radical left media, it is 
uncommon in the academic literature.  
Therefore, commentators seem to disagree on whether the administration deliberately 
ignored the crisis in order to avoid a quagmire, or if it was due to a wrong initial assessment of 
the situation on the ground. Along these lines, Sorenson shares its scepticism about the 
likeliness of a successful US military intervention in Syria in favour of the opposition. In the 
one hand, the author argues that the conflict quickly became widespread throughout the country, 
with a high number of different groups involved with different agendas (Sorenson, 2013, p. 6). 
On the other, the author suggests that the US has nonetheless interests in containing the conflict, 
because of the potential devastating effect linked with the increase in the Shia-Sunni divide, the 
WMD issues and the rise of extremists’ groups (Sorenson, 2013). 
The literature generally addresses the US policy toward Syria regarding the uprising 
separately from its policy regarding the addition of a new actor in the conflict: ISIS. As such, a 
consensus which considers the rise of ISIS as a game changer in US policy emerges from the 
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literature. According to Allin, the administration’s position prior the rise of ISIS was that its 
predecessor has devoted too much blood and money into a counterproductive war in Iraq. As 
such the administration engages in a pivot toward Asia (Allin, 2014, p. 168). In order to deal 
with the threat posed by ISIS, Juneau argues that the US adopted a new strategy consisting of 
three pillars: the first consists in the use of air power in Iraq and Syria to strike ISIS. As the 
origin of the groups has its roots in a broken political system in Iraq and Syria, the US tried to 
use diplomatic pressure in order to obtain a political solution to the conflict (Juneau, 2015, p. 
36). It also sent material support to the Iraqi’s forces, the Peshmergas and tribal militias (Juneau, 
2015, p. 37). A strong Iraq would get back to its pre-2003 rivalry with Iran rather than becoming 
its ally (Juneau, 2015, p. 38).  
Some authors recognising the political roots of the conflict, seek to shed light on those. 
Almaric for its parts notes, referring to the president’s attack on the Iraqis for their lack of 
willingness to fight, that the Iraqis debacle took sources in the US failure to effectively pressure 
Al-Abadi to integrate Sunnis in the army (Amalric, 2015). Others go back further in history 
such as Lee and Luizard who reasons that the Syrian uprising takes its source in the rivalry in 
former colonial power in the Post-WWI period, where the French and the British shared the 
Middle East (Smith, 2014, p. 9; Luizard, 2015). The instrumentalisation of sects by the French 
would have ramifications to reach the Assads’ reign who also used rivalries between sects to 
maintain his power (Smith, 2014). This author also argues that the roots of the 2011 Syrian 
revolts can also be found in the assassination of the Sunni Lebanon Prime Minister Harari in 
2005 (Smith, 2014, p. 16).  
Other commentators have simply rejected any type of use of force in Syria as a potential 
successful strategy, including against ISIS. Rahmanovic et al. relying on strategic theories that 
the use of force requires that the objective is attainable through military means, which is not the 
case in Syria. Therefore the goal pursued by Western nations is unattainable (Rahmanovic, et 
al., 2016, p. 3). If Western nations are to “pick” one side by providing them with weapons, it 
automatically nullifies the prospect of long-term stability which is the original objective 
(Rahmanovic, et al., 2016, p. 4). 
Consequently, for some experts, it seems that this lack of commitment of use of force 
in Syria, or ‘restraint’, was consistent with the view of the administration on interventionism in 
the Middle East. The administration has nonetheless ceded when facing the rise of ISIS. The 
use of force through the support of rebels has also been coined by some as ineffective and 
potentially dangerous. 
This paper will not engage the theoretical debate between interventionists and non-
interventionists, realists or liberal, but instead will seek to assess the impact of the Obama 
Foreign Policy on the ground. The disagreement in the literature over balancing US interests in 
the Middle East with US democracy promotion will be addressed in a pragmatic manner. This 
paper will seek to contribute to the debate opposing commentators on the quality of the 
administration initial assessment of the threat posed by the uprising. Regarding the debate on 
the effectiveness of the US approach in dealing with the political roots of the crisis, this thesis 
will try to draw parallels with US policy towards other countries subjected to the Arab Spring, 
in order to gauge the potential impact of alternative policies. To finish with, this article will 
seek to contribute to the discussion about the necessity of the use of force in Syria and the its 
consequences. 
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This thesis will argue that Obama’s FP in the Middle East has been involving in a 
context of American growing isolationism, initiated as a repercussion of Bush’s wars. Usually, 
research available in the literature focus on the US use of violence in Syria, responsibility to 
protect, actors’ crimes and geo-strategic implications. Others seek to establish the roots of ISIS 
and study the cause of its attraction. Very few papers draw a link between the US growing 
isolationism and the rise of ISIS. In order to address these topics, this research will conduct an 
exploratory study following a deductive logic. It will rely on primary data collected by the IISS, 
using its Armed Conflict Database. This database provides valuable information on different 
political, military and diplomatic events organised per day which eases the researcher in its 
exploration of events. Reports on events are collected by the IISS from authoritative sources 
(Ettinger, 1997). This research will also rely on secondary data, from peer-reviewed academic 
journals and reports made by think tanks keeping close tracks of the events on the ground. This 
will open the road for future research on American Isolationism and its impact on the world 
order. 
III. International Context 
This part will look at the US interests in key countries which had experienced the Arab 
spring and to key Allies in the area impacted by it. The goal of this chapter is to provide a 
context and highlight the different approaches taken by the administration depending on the 
country. This will be valuable for the analytical part in the Chapter V, as it will show the US 
contradictions, but also the limits of its capacities in the Syrian case. As such, a first sub-part 
will discuss the US interests in the Middle East and its stance on democracy, and will look at 
the recent development preceding the Arab Spring in Iraq. Then the US attitude toward the 
revolution in Egypt and Libya, two countries in which the US has played an important role in 
shaping the outcome of their revolution, will be highlighted. These parallel developments which 
contrasted with the US policy in Syria, will help to characterise the potential capacities of the 
US in shaping the outcome of these revolutions to preserve its interests. As the US foreign 
policy also takes into consideration the interests of its allies, Chapter III-3 will look at the stance 
of key allies having interests in Syria at stakes. A last part will seek to lay down the diplomatic 
and military constrains on the US administration. 
A. The US, the Middle East and the Arab spring 
1. US interests and objectives in the Middle East 
If we are to consider US foreign policy in the Middle East, the best place to start would 
be to look at its interests and objectives in the region. Traditionally, the Middle East was at the 
centre of the East-West competition during the Cold War, considered vital to the US to be 
leading in the rivalry with Moscow (Hunter, 2015, p. 96). If the development of the Shale gas 
in the recent years has reduced US own dependence on Middle Eastern oil (Lieber, 2016, p. 
130; Hokayem & Wasser, 2014, p. 148), for European countries and Japan, Middle-East Oil 
flows remain vital. As a country inclined to global trade, the proper functioning of the World 
economy heavily impacts US domestically. The area is also the home of Israel, a country with 
deep roots in American society enjoying a special relationship based on strategic, economic, 
military and cultural interests. Internal wars would be destructive and would disrupt oil prices. 
As a result, the US will seek to resolve conflicts when it has the means to do so. Nonetheless, 
it is important to note that the US do not have primordial interests in Syria itself. Contrary to 
Israel, Iran, Egypt or Saudi Arabia, Syria was not considered as a major power in the area, and 
often aligned with other powers such as Egypt for its competition with Israel, or Iran when 
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seeking to destabilise American Post-War efforts in Iraq. The destruction the civil war is 
bringing to Syria will lead to a decade of reconstruction and stabilisation efforts. The 
competition for influence between rival powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia (a US ally) have 
tended to bend in favour of the latter until the Maliki’s government (Lieber, 2016, p. 61). The 
main danger of the Syrian conflict is that it could spread to its neighbourhood and in turn disrupt 
the weak regional equilibrium, which has tended over the last decades to rather play into US 
interests (Sorenson, 2013, p. 6). Europe is also facing the largest refugee crisis since the WWII, 
notably taking its origins in the Libyan and Syrian civil war, becoming the main source of 
tensions between states within the Union. The increasing use of sectarianism in the conflict 
could spill out over the region and challenge the status quo in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Lebanon 
and Yemen. The US have therefore an interest in containing the conflict within the Syrian 
border. The US are also committed to the reduction of weapons of mass destruction in the world 
which includes Chemical Weapons, owned and used by the regime in 2013 and 2017. The 
danger is that those weapons would end up in the hands of the wrong parties. This led the 
Obama administration to set a “red line” in 2012, as it sought to deter the regime from using 
them or displacing them (Sorenson, 2013). Then, the US has historically voiced its preference 
for democratic regimes and is involved in several programmes promoting democracy 
throughout the world.  
2. US Stance on Democracy 
Democracy is an important pillar of US culture. The promotion of democracy is often 
linked to American interests: democracies are more stable in the long run, their borders are open 
for trades and people, and are less likely to engage in war between each other’s (Moravcsik, 
2010; Owen, 1994; Gartzke, et al., 2001). In the Middle East, democratic regime would ensure 
the free flow of oil and reduce the likeliness of conflicts between states (David & Goldberg, 
2013, p. 261). Whether agreed with or not, this view is shared by most US officials but at 
different degrees. Indeed, if the importance of this value and the role it plays in American 
Foreign policy agenda fluctuates overtime, it had stayed in the discourse of different presidents 
over the last decades. While Obama’s policy can be said to be in reaction of its predecessor 
policy, the emphasis on this value can be found in George Bush justification for its wars, but 
also in the Obama Cairo discourse (Obama, 2009). In the literature, two views seem to be 
opposed: in the one hand, some have highlighted the effort by some administrations to advance 
democracy in the region, while others have argued that the US have consistently opposed 
groups pursuing democratic change in the Middle East (Hashemi, 2012, p. 36).  
The reality probably lays between the two views. For sure, the different administrations 
seem to have always opted for stability over democracy. This is reflected in Bush speech in 
2003, who was the exception to this rule (Indyk, et al., 2012, p. 143), where he questioned 
Western support for undemocratic regimes and stated that “stability cannot be purchased at the 
expense of liberty” (Bush, 2003). In this way, he acknowledged the preference for illiberal 
regime when it suited the US during the last decades. This has been the case in the Middle- East 
since the US have taken over the influence of former colonial powers in the region. In other 
words, the US would favour an autocratic regime upon supporting democratic groups if these 
groups threaten in any ways US interests or the stability of the region. While the US have been 
constantly heavily involved in the Middle East, these countries largely rank at the bottom of 
democracy rankings. One precondition for getting US support for democratization, is that this 
process should not pose a threat toward US interests listed in the first part of this chapter. 
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Therefore, this policy does not imply a systematic response to democratic aspiration. As 
Madeline Albrught points out “Arab Public, after all, can be rather scary”. Eisenhower once 
told that “we have a campaign of hatred against us, not by the [Arab] governments but by the 
people. The people are on Nasser's side” (Hashemi, 2012, p. 40). These comments reflect the 
rather cautious stance the US have taken over the last decades toward democracy in the middle 
East, but also the paradox of US foreign policy laying between its rhetoric and actions. The 
promotion of democracy takes an important place in the American hearts and minds due to the 
historical context of their own country which have received external support for their 
revolution. The US sees itself as “the beacon of freedom to the world’s oppressed” (Indyk, et 
al., 2012, p. 142). But if democracy means a change in institutions in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, 
or Bahrein, would Washington systematically support it? The answer is probably not. The 
question of democracy in Syria will be addressed in Chapter V-A. This chapter will argue that 
Obama have missed an opportunity to promote democracy without being necessarily conflicting 
with national interests. In Syria, many believed in the US commitment to defend the people’s 
aspiration to democracy. The disappointment over Obama’s commitment to democracy in Syria 
will later contribute to increase resentment against the US, over which the ISIS will be able to 
capitalise on. 
a. Iraq 
Accordingly, there were instances where the Obama administration did seek to promote 
democracy when it went along its interests. It was the case in Iraq. During Bush’s mandate, 
after having tried to find a way to make sure the Sunni population were represented in the Iraqi’s 
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political system, under the pressure of the Kurdish and Shia coalition majority, the US ceded 
which led to the introduction of a constitution giving the power to the majority, ignoring the 
representation of minorities (Luizard, 2015). In Iraq, this meant giving power to Sects, in this 
case the Shia majority. Rather than having a system based on the expression of the democratic 
will, it ended up by being a majority taking its source on sectarian demography, with a very 
poor representation of the Sunni population (Luizard, 2015). The Obama administration for its 
part urged Maliki to introduce reforms to increase the inclusiveness of the Iraqi political system, 
but was ignored. The administration knew that this situation would end up by triggering a revolt 
from Sunnis against what was then known as a weak state. Instead, when the US left Iraq in 
2011, as Maliki launched a repression against the Sunnis, he also purged the army to leave in 
place its most loyal elements against the US advise (Lieber, 2016, p. 60). Maliki’s policy 
offered a fertile ground for Al Qaeda, which would later succeed in mobilising Sunnis in rural 
areas in the form of the Islamic State in Iraq (Fromson & Simon, 2015, p. 24). The impact of 
this policy seems to be more relevant to explain the rise of ISIS in Iraq, rather than the American 
war in Iraq itself. Indeed, while the US managed to keep Al Qaeda at a very low profile, the 
2011 repression on Sunnis initiated by the Maliki government in combination with the US 
withdrawal in 2011 have fuelled the group resurrection (Hashim, 2014). 
b. The Arab Spring and the Libyan and Egyptian Experience 
As the administration spoke and acted in favour of regime change in Egypt and Libya, 
it could be argued that Obama did support democracy but cautiously. While in Syria, the 
argument goes, the uprising quickly became militarised and the opposition had difficulty to 
show a united front, it was not the case in Egypt. In Libya, the opposition quickly organised 
around the National Transitional Council and the administration believed it could rely on its 
closest allies to deal with potential setbacks and the postbellum period. Yet there are reasons to 
be sceptical about this explanation. 
The Egyptian case was particularly problematic for the administration, and contrasted 
with the Syrian or Libyan situation. With Egypt, the US had a long relationship based on mutual 
security interests. Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in exchange for US engagement 
toward Egypt’s security, and quickly became the most powerful military power of the Arab 
World with the support of the US (Indyk, et al., 2012, p. 142). As Mubarak has been a rather 
reliable partner throughout the years, the Egyptian uprising embarrassed the administration 
(Hashemi, 2012, p. 33). Obama had the choice between supporting a reliable key ally and 
supporting democracy which might propel the Muslim Brotherhood in power in Egypt and by 
doing so potentially threatens Israel’s security (Indyk, et al., 2012). Obama chose the latter. The 
US choice can be explained by a reassessment of the threat: Washington concluded that the 
relationship with Israel would not be threatened, because it was not in the interests of Egypt as 
the US disposed enough leverage over it (Lissa, 2011). The US threatened to suspend its $1.3 
billion a year military assistance program if the army were to charge protestors. As US laws 
requires a suspension of military assistance in the case of its use against unarmed protestors 
(Indyk, Liberthal, & O'Hanlon, 2012, p. 145), it is likely that this leverage was in “automatic 
mode”, and that the administration found itself cornered. Nonetheless it was successful in 
forcing Mubarak to step down. 
The Libyan case perfectly exemplifies the tensions between US national interests and 
its will to promote its democratic model. As Gadhafi was heading to launch its troops against 
Benghazi, threatening to commit a genocide some NATO countries stepped in, backed by a 
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resolution voted by the UNSC (Engelbrekt, 2014). The Libyan case revealed the divisions 
within the Obama administration. Two lines were conflicting: the US State department was 
pushing for a military intervention in favour of the rebels, while the Pentagon was sceptical 
about this kind of operation (Garfinkle, 2014, p. 268). Obama was ambivalent on the question. 
The reason for its hesitation can be explained by the initial approach he had on foreign policy 
affairs. In 2006, before announcing its candidature for President of the US, he declared that 
strategy should not be driven by ideology or politics, but by a pragmatic approach considering 
facts on the ground and US interests (Lissa, 2011). This can explain its reluctance to engage 
with the notion of democratic promotion. On the other hand, Obama also later recognised that 
repression “threaten the political and economic stability of some of our allies” (Lissa, 2011). 
He decided to set a series of conditions which had to be met to consider a military intervention. 
First, the Arab League would have to support it, and a UN mandate based on Chapter 7 was 
required. At its surprise, and maybe against its wish, these conditions were met in March 2011. 
The President decided to leave two of its key allies, the UK and France, operate the intervention 
while “leading from behind” (Garfinkle, 2014, p. 268). Contrary to Syria, Libya was rather 
isolated and did not enjoy strong support from its allies. 
There are two implications of the Libyan case for Syria. The first is that the operation 
conducted (mainly) by France and the UK revealed the poor military capabilities of US 
European allies due to their shortage of ammunition (Engelbrekt, 2014; Lieber, 2016, p. 31). 
Their struggle to find states willing to involve the required number of planes for the mission to 
succeed, also revealed their lack of coordination aptitudes. This would make the US understand 
the actual poor capabilities of the European defence and their high dependence on the US. The 
lack of postbellum preparation by the UK and France led to the Benghazi raid and the instability 
will be felt all the way to Mali. This required the intervention of the French Army in the country, 
again financed in part by Washington and Canada (Le Monde.fr & AFP, 2013). This precedent 
that might have weighed in the US consideration of the use of western forces in Syria. The 
second is that Russia will use the intervention in Libya as a stink bomb being a perfect example 
of the consequences of Western interventionism to oppose most of resolutions against the 
Syrian regime at the UNSC (Katz, 2013, p. 42). 
As with Egypt, the President found itself in the position to be credited for promoting 
democracy and protecting people against barbaric dictators. Nonetheless, it seems that this was 
actually a position taken by “default”. In Egypt, it appears that the President had actually done 
little apart from public speeches in favour of democratic principles. It appears that the sanctions 
resulted from a mechanism rather than the president’s will to pressure Mubarak. In Libya, the 
hesitation of the president can lead to think that this decision was done under the pressure of its 
advisers and European allies. The Libyan experience would set a precedent which will be used 
by Russia to oppose any western intervention in Syria at the UNSC. 
3. The US and Its NATO Allies in Syria 
Two visions of the Syrian crisis emerged from the international community. One siding 
with the regime in Damascus as Russia, arguing that Syria is a sovereign State, and the Assad 
regime have the legitimacy to deal with the threat posed by the Islamic State while there is no 
credible alternative to its ruling (Allison, 2013, p. 815). For Moscow, authoritarian regimes in 
the area can maintain stability, as opposed to the situation in Iraq or Libya where dictators have 
been toppled (Nardon, 2016, p. 17). The other one is that Assad must step down, endorsed by 
the US, the UK and France, mostly based on moral ground and because the opposition is the 
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only force that can fight both the roots of the emergence of the ISIS and ISIS itself. Nonetheless, 
its allies also faced domestic political constraints., 
There has been few US military intervention in the world which did not have the support 
of the UK. Initially, the UK was supportive of the French pressure to intervene in Syria. As the 
chemical weapons attack on civilians occurred, David Cameron drafted a plan to intervene 
against the Assad forces. As Russia kept opposing military intervention at the UN, the number 
of European countries willing to intervene was further reducing (Strategic Survey, 2014, p. 
189). The House of Commons ultimately rejected the UK intervention in Syria. This in turn 
would put pressure on the Obama administration to seek an unsecured congressional approval.  
France would be the last man standing. When the regime used chemical weapons, 
France was ready to launch a military operation against the regime’s target, but was aborted 30 
to 40 minutes before French fighter jets took off (Levallois, 2016, p. 80). President Obama has 
traced a red line on the use of chemical weapons, obviously taken more seriously by the French 
President than Assad. Unable to act on its own, France assisted to the US ceding the 
management of this crisis to the Russians and Iranians (Levallois, 2016, p. 80). The emergence 
of the Islamic State further reinforced Russia as a central player in the crisis. In September 
2015, Russia will start an air campaign against targets in Syria, further reducing any prospect 
for the French of a military intervention against the regime. 
Sixty height years after the Peymiani Sanowar treaty which committed Kurdish 
communities to safeguard their culture, language and assert their mutual support, in July 2012 
Kurds gained de facto their autonomy in Syria (Gunter, 2015, p. 107). At the beginning of the 
revolution, the Kurds were reluctant to take part in the fight against the regime. But soon, they 
emerged as a key actor in Syria with the emergence of the Islamic State under the leadership of 
the Democratic Union Party (PYD), organisation associated with the PKK. The PKK is 
considered by the Turkish authorities and NATO as a terrorist organisation. For Turkey, both 
the Assad Regime and the PKK represent a threat to its interests. Ankara has been accused of 
complacency with the Jihadists as they appeared to cross the Turkish-Syrian border rather easily 
(Gunter, 2015, p. 103). In this view, the Jihadists were both fighting the regime and the Kurds, 
Ankara’s behaviour with its border reflected its interests in Syria. However, this analysis tends 
to ignore the long history of smuggling networks in the area, which have been developed over 
the last decades. It also ignores the complexity of the Syrian opposition, divided into different 
groups, with Islamist elements, and the fighting within opposition. In other words, while some 
media reported on the Turkish authorities’ smuggling of weapons which appeared in some cases 
to have ended up into ISIS hands, it is hard to conclude that it was initially intended. 
Furthermore, as Turkey is sharing 822 km with Syria and a further 331 km with Iraq, securing 
more than a thousand kilometres of borders require heavy investment, and would hardly be 
impermeable. Moreover, this effort would have to be done by a country which does not appear 
to have interests in doing so. In other words, there is a difference between a country actively 
supporting ISIS and a country refusing to spur millions of investments required to secure a 
border against a threat. Especially when this threat is not turned against him, but instead would 
rather play along its interests. Consequently, the US have helped financially Turkey to secure 
its border. Turkey has launched military operations in Syria, publicly to support the fight against 
ISIS, but it would appear that the operations conducted were targeting the PKK in Syria. To 
conclude with, the clashing interests between the US and Turkey seems to mainly revolve 
around the Kurdish question. 
  
 
  
Back to Table of Contents 
Core text: 
How did Obama’s foreign policy encourage the rise of ISIS? 11  
It is in this context that the Obama policy in Syria would have to evolve. With two of 
its main European military partners waiting for him to act, and another fearing secession on its 
own territory, Obama has ended up by upsetting both. The lack of reactivity of the Obama 
administration has empowered the Kurds who became de facto the only force effectively 
fighting ISIS in Syria. As a result, the US would later provide support to their fighters to the 
great displeasure of Turkey. Turkey for its part, fearing the empowerment of the Kurds, turned 
a blind eye over the traffic at its border. It is interesting to note that the Kurds were reluctant to 
join the opposition to the Syrian regime until late 2012 (Holliday, 2012, p. 33). Initially, 
supporting the Syrian opposition would not have posed a major threat to Turkey. François 
Hollande will later confess that the Obama’s decision was the biggest frustration of its mandate, 
and as it revealed the inability of France to act on its own, was a blow to the French stature in 
the international arena. The Obama’s decision will impede any alternative to the regime as it 
led to the 2013 debacle of the opposition in favour of ISIS as it will be discussed in the next 
section. As the prospect of an intervention against Damascus was reducing, it finally moved the 
attention of Western leaders from the Syrian regime to the ISIS. 
B. US FP and Its Limited Options 
The US FP is often defined in terms of what it can do rather than what it wants to do. 
Its policy options are defined by the rules of the countries, but also the rules defining the world 
order it helped to shape since the WWII. The last part sought to establish US interests, values 
and the position of its key NATO allies over the Syrian crisis and their relationship with the 
US. This has permitted to draw the first lines of Obama’s room for manoeuvre in the 
international arena. The next section will seek to contemplate the different diplomatic and 
military options available to the President regarding the region, the UN and its domestic 
political context. In turn, this will provide a background on which the last chapter will be 
developed.  
1. Instability in the Middle East 
As the situation developed from 2011 to 2015 with a near-collapse of the Syrian state, 
it resulted in a lack of institutional legitimacy which thrived non-state actors at the centre of the 
stage (Gunter, 2015, p. 103). These actors would set the agenda, and embodied divisions 
existing within the international communities, resulting in the today’s chaos. For some the 
chaos in Syria, Iraq and Egypt is the result of decades of US interventionism in the Arab world, 
particularly pointing at its wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and its stance on the Israel-Arab relations 
(Garfinkle, 2014, p. 267). Some goes further by arguing that the chaos in the region takes its 
origin in a century of involvement by Western countries, starting with the Sykes-Picot 
agreement (Luizard, 2015). It is interesting to note that this narrative is also shared by ISIS 
itself. As a result, Western countries should refrain from engaging in any form of intervention 
in the region. This ethnocentric view tends to deny the people of these countries their own 
history developed independently of Western interventions, and takes a deterministic approach 
where US policy would be the determining factor of any development in the area. The Syrian 
crisis takes its roots in the Arab Spring, a movement resulting from years of lack of 
opportunities for a frustrated youth population, of the failure of states in the area to provide 
people with basic public services while using a high degree repression against any dissidents. 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that countries the most affected by this spring in the Arab World, 
are the countries with a disproportionate youth population (more than half of the Syrian 
population is under 25), a high level of unemployment, and highly corrupted regime with at 
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their head-dictator ruling with an extreme use of violence (Guidère, 2012). What leads to a 
revolution is often the issue, not the revolution itself. In other words, other socio-economic 
factors might have played an important role which tends to be ignored by this reductionist 
approach of the region. Therefore, it would be mistaking to consider the past US FP as entirely 
responsible the today’s chaos while ignoring the socio-economic forces behind these 
revolutions. It is not to say that the past US foreign policy did not have any consequences on 
today’s situation, but it should not be the starting point of any analysis of the Arab Spring 
movements. While the second term Obama’s administration has given a lot of attention to the 
cost of military intervention in an unstable region, it has given little consideration for the cost 
of not intervening in Syria (Mintz & Wayne, 2016, p. 140).  
Furthermore, the ethno-centric view described above, found its way in the highest 
positions of State with the nomination of Robert Malley as Special Assistant to the President 
and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf Region (Bahout, 
2016, p. 87). This nomination follows the publication of Malley’s article in the New York 
Review of Books, “This is not a revolution”. In this article, Malley takes a perilous primordialist 
approach of the sectarian conflict and argue that essentially the political forces behind these 
movements are the result of the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, different Islamist groups 
and, of course, in an anti-Western resentment (Agha & Malley, 2012). Therefore, there might 
have been confusion between the past US interventions and the potential benefits in intervening 
in Syria. The administration had to consider 3 different paths to deal with this crisis. The first 
was the diplomatic efforts consisting in economic sanctions and pressure at the UN, the second 
consisted in supporting the rebels and the third in a military intervention. As such, the first path 
was initially preferred by the administration but had consistently faced the Russian veto as 
discussed in the next section. The second and third options consist in the use of hard-power and 
will be addressed in the last part of this chapter. 
2. The Diplomatic Front 
As regime started to fall one after the other, the Arab Spring has raised concerns for 
China and Russia because of its internationalised nature (Blank, 2011, p. 89). Moscow feared 
that these conflicts could spread all the way to their territory. With the North-Caucasus already 
subjected to an insurrection, Putin feared that it could get out of control. Furthermore, by 
suggesting the Syrian insurrection is fuelled by external actors (implying the US or its allies), 
Moscow seeks to maintain its image of a besieged fortress by hostile powers (Blank, 2011, p. 
89). Along these lines, Russia also brandished the Libyan experience to demonstrate the 
foolishness of western interventionism. It is interesting to note that Russia now enjoys from 
very good relations with the new Libyan government (Katz, 2013, p. 42). It also fears that these 
revolutions could spread to Central Asian countries, considered to be in its so-called “near-
abroad” (Rywkin, 2003). Damascus is also one of the biggest clients of its arm industry, and 
home of its only naval base in the Mediterranean. There are probably strategic implications. As 
a Russian ally, backing Damascus is also sending a message to its allies but also other countries 
that Moscow does not abandon its friends, while the US let down Mubarak, who almost faced 
death penalty (Associated Press, 2012). As a result, the US, France, the UK and Gulf countries 
repeatedly sought to resolve the Syrian crisis at the UN, but faced a systematic Russian veto, 
sometimes backed by China. Meanwhile, Russia was selling two dozen MiG fighters and air 
defence system to the regime, while the size of the protests in Syria reached new records (IISS 
ACD, 2015, p. February). Every diplomatic effort led by Western countries faced an almost 
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systematic opposition from Russia. Three UN special envoys have succeeded one another from 
2012 onward, without any signs of relief for the Syrian people. Meanwhile, the civil war gave 
birth to the most powerful terrorist groups still active today. Therefore, as the diplomatic front 
was unsuccessful, the military options available at that time to the US administration should be 
assessed. 
3. US Domestic Constrain & Military Options 
Since the Vietnam war, any military intervention had to fulfil conditions that had to be 
met regarding the public opinion. Before using force abroad, the US had to have clear interests 
at stakes with clear objectives. Then, the use of force must take place on a short period of time, 
and US soldiers must not be exposed unnecessarily. Finally, the US should not launch and carry 
the weight of the war alone, but should be supported by allies (Hunter, 2015, p. 99). The US 
public opinion has been exhausted by what is seen as an unnecessary war in Iraq where the US 
is engaged since 2003. There is also a fatigue among policy makers, reluctant to approve any 
new wars (Sorenson, 2013, p. 8). After 10 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the cost of war 
in dollars and blood is well known by the American public, a public sceptical about the prospect 
of a “short war” and clearly opposing it (Nardon, 2016, p. 16). Nonetheless, the administration 
has been under pressure to provide the opposition with weapons, notably by Senator McCain, 
a respected Veteran, who considered that Obama had no strategy in Syria (Rugh, 2013, p. 16). 
Therefore, the US can only contemplate a limited number of military options in Syria. With 
these factors in mind, the General Martin Dempsey proposed options to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that can be summarised as following. The first option is to arm, train and 
advise opposition groups from neighbouring countries. The second option is inspired by the 
Libyan experience, and offers to conduct air strikes on the regime’s targets in support of the 
opposition. Another option would require a costly no-fly zone estimated at $1 billion per month 
in order to prevent the regime from targeting civilians and the opposition. A buffer zone in 
neighbouring countries could also be contemplated in order to avoid violation of the Syrian 
sovereignty over its territory (Sorenson, 2013, p. 8). The most discussed options before the 
Russian intervention were the No-Fly zones and support to the insurgent. The first was seen as 
highly costly, and the second raised scepticism because of the risk of having American weapons 
in the hands of the wrong groups (Sorenson, 2013, pp. 10, 11). 
While the US have been heavily involved in human rights programs, it has nonetheless 
prioritized its national interests in the Middle-East. Maliki’s policy toward Sunnis and the 
withdrawal of the US in Iraq paved the way for the rise of ISIS in Iraq. In Egypt, the US enjoyed 
a strong leverage over the regime which has been used to pressure Mubarak out of power. 
Nonetheless, it appears that the administration had no other choice but to ask the departure of 
Mubarak because the US-Egyptian military cooperation would have been impacted. The Libyan 
precedent have highlighted the limit of the military capacities of European allies, and showed 
to the administration their dependence on the US. Concerning its allies, the US was teared apart 
between the different views and interests of its allies. Militarily, it also ended up amputated 
from an important ally which made the prospect of a military intervention very painful. As a 
result, in Syria the administration has done its best to limit its engagement, favouring a 
diplomatic resolution of the conflict. The management of the Syrian crisis have nonetheless 
impacted US interests, the question to address is whether this management have reduced at best 
the potential effects on US interests. As the conflict prolonged, the Syrian field became more 
complex with the internationalisation of the civil war. Rather than being contained in the Syrian 
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territory, it spread to neighbouring countries with the help of ISIS. As it will be discussed in the 
next chapter, there appears to be a link between the lack of support to the Syrian opposition and 
the rise of ISIS. 
While the US have been heavily involved in human rights programs, it has nonetheless 
prioritised its national interests in the Middle East. Maliki’s policy toward Sunnis and the 
withdrawal of the US in Iraq paved the way for the rise of ISIS in Iraq. In Egypt, the US enjoyed 
a strong leverage over the regime which has been used to pressure Mubarak out of power. 
Nonetheless, it appears that the administration had no other choice but to ask the departure of 
Mubarak because the US-Egyptian military co-operation would have been impacted. The 
Libyan precedent has highlighted the limit of the military capacities of European allies, and 
showed to the administration their dependence on the US. Concerning its allies, the US was 
teared apart between the different views and interests of its allies. Militarily, it also ended up 
amputated from an important ally which made the prospect of a military intervention very 
painful. As a result, in Syria the administration has done its best to limit its engagement, 
favouring a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. The management of the Syrian crisis have 
nonetheless impacted US interests, the question to address is whether this management have 
reduced at best the potential effects on US interests. As the conflict prolonged, the Syrian Field 
became more complex with the internationalisation of the civil war. Rather than being contained 
in the Syrian Territory, it spread to neighbouring countries with the help of ISIS. As it will be 
discussed in the next chapter, there appears to be a link between the lack of support to the Syrian 
opposition and the rise of ISIS. 
 
IV. The US and the Rise of ISIS 
A. The Armed resistance 
With the systematic opposition of the Russians and Chinese at the UN reduced the 
prospect of a collective action in Syria. The US and the UK closure of their embassies in 
Damascus in February 2012 also reduced the scope of a political solution (Holliday, 2012, p. 
9). As a result, voices were raised to start supporting the opposition with material assistance. 
At this point, for some commentators the future of the conflict will be shaped by the ability of 
the opposition to organise and respond to the regime’s violence (Holliday, 2012, p. 9). The 
armed resistance began to benefit from defections from the regular army. Videos released on 
the internet presented defectors showing their IDs, stating their names and service numbers, 
announcing they were joining the armed opposition. They were motivated by their refusal to 
fire on demonstrators and instead decided to protect protestors against the regime’s violent 
repression (Holliday, 2012, p. 14). While the regime raised the use of violence further with the 
systematic use of tanks and artillery and besieged Homs (IISS ACD, 2015, p. January 2012), 
violence escalated decisively in February 2012 in the city, which witnessed the growth of armed 
resistance in the reaction of the regime’s use of violence (Holliday, 2012, p. 10). The Free 
Syrian Army was formed in August 2011 by defectors from the regular army. Its funding came 
from Syrians and external actors such as Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany and 
the Syrian diaspora (Zuhur, 2015, p. 151; Herbert, 2014, p. 80). The material support of the US 
came late and was non-lethal as the US was providing food and medical supplies to the National 
Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) (Blanchard & Humud, 2017, p. 29), 
an umbrella organisation joined by the FSA only in 2013. At the beginning, armed opposition 
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groups were openly secular and raised as a popular resistance movement (Holliday, 2012, p. 
14). This secularism might take its roots in the defection of officers, as the regular army filter 
its entry and require from its soldier a secular attitude (Bou Nassif, 2015, p. 637). Other groups 
were inspired by Islam, but were mostly motivated by a fight for democracy as their attitude 
could suggest (drinking alcohol, or rarely praying) (Holliday, 2012, p. 37). Their slogans 
revealed the nationalistic dimension of their movements rather than a religious one (Droz-
Vincent, 2014, p. 47). Yet, there were reasons to fear the rise of sectarianism in the conflict. 
B. A Corrupted Revolution 
If the FSA had a nationalistic agenda it lacked a clear hierarchy linking its different 
fighting groups to the central commandment based in Turkey. Jihadist groups were able to 
capitalise on this lack of coordination. If the armed opposition began to appear as having 
Jihadist elements with the first terrorist attacks committed in late 2011, these cells initially took 
origins in the release of Islamists from prison in 2011 and the Jihadist cells already existing in 
Syria prior the revolution was entertained by the regime (Lister, 2014, p. 71; Luizard, 2015). 
By 2013, more than a thousand armed groups were operating in Syria, supported by different 
actors. The divisions between different supporting actors, notably from Gulf countries, were 
felt in the battle field, as the different groups had conflicting agenda (Lister, 2014, p. 72). 
Jihadist cells took a prominent place in the reading of the Syrian conflict as they were an 
important cause of concern for the West. Syria offered terrorist organisations a field for their 
recruits to train, fight and offered a stage where they could show an international face (Lister, 
2014, p. 91). As such, organisations from Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt, Russia, Turkey and 
Uzbekistan started to implement themselves into Syria (Lister, 2014, p. 91).  
ISIS was the actor who benefited the most from the Syrian Chaos. While a lot of 
attention has been drawn from the impact of the American War in Iraq on the group, it is 
interesting to note that the group first gained control over territory in Syria, from which they 
could launch an offensive into the Iraqis territory (IISS ACD, 2015). Isolated, rejected and 
weakened in Iraq, the Islamic State in Iraq was in state of crisis when its new leader Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi took the leadership in 2010 (Hashim, 2014, p. 73). Al Baghdadi restructured the 
organisation by introducing governing bodies such as the Shura Council (which mission is to 
check on the leader compliance with its task), the Military council and the Security and 
Intelligence Council (Hashim, 2014, p. 74). While the power of its predecessor was 
concentrated at its top, this division of labour enabled more flexibility which will result in the 
adoption of a grand strategy inspired by the theory of Abu Bakr Naji “the management of 
savagery” (Hashim, 2014, p. 75).  
The participation in the outbreak of the Syrian civil war was a logical step. First, the 
narrative went as a Secular Alawite regime was targeting Muslim Sunni brother. Then, many 
members of the organisation were originally Syrians, as the Syrian regime used them to weaken 
the American effort to stabilize Iraq, by allowing them to operate and retrench from/in Syria 
(Benraad, 2014, p. 29). Finally, the Syrian civil war offered the Islamic State the chaos 
necessary for the organisation to gain popular support at best, or at least acquiescence in 
accordance with Abu Bakr Naji’s theory (Hashim, 2014, p. 75). The scission with its sponsored 
group in Syria Al-Nusra, led some Al-Nusra fighters to join the Iraqis organisation or failing 
that, to be seized by the group near the Iraqis border (Luizard, 2015). Al Nusra was dependant 
on its then parent group in Iraq, and appeared to have suffered from the split with ISIS, with 
manpower decreasing and drained by its now rival (Lister, 2014, p. 85). In February 2014, ISIS 
  
 
  
Back to Table of Contents 
Core text: 
How did Obama’s foreign policy encourage the rise of ISIS? 16  
launched a series of attacks on Jabhat Al Nusra controlled positions in the outskirt of Deir Ez 
Zour (IISS ACD, 2015, p. February 2014). In March 2014, it attacked the Hassakeh province, 
held by al-Nusra militants, after having seized weapon storages in Markada (IISS ACD, 2015, 
p. March 2014). Once implemented in Syria, it could seize FSA and Kurdish positions (IISS 
ACD, 2015) with the acquiescence of the Syrian regime (Barnard, 2015). On the 8th January 
2014, following the seizure of their Headquarter in Aleppo by the Islamic Front (allied to the 
FSA), the ISIS pledged to crush all the Syrian National Coalition Forces (IISS ACD, 2015, p. 
January 2014). The next month it launched a series of terrorist attacks and assassinations on 
SNC affiliated groups in Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor and in the Idled province (IISS ACD, 2015, p. 
February 2014), and capitalized on clashes between Turkey and the PKK (Lister, 2014, p. 82). 
The same months, twenty Jihadi scholars call on Muslims to join ISIS (IISS ACD, 2015, p. 
February 2014). ISIS values particularly the Syrian territory, and made Raqqa (Syria) its capital 
(Lister, 2014, p. 74). After June 2014, ISIS made significant gains in Iraq, ripping out Iraqis 
security forces from their brand new American M16, M198 howitzers and armoured Humvees 
which will find their way to the Syrian battlefield (Lister, 2014, p. 78). The control over large 
territory in the Northern to the Eastern part of Syria, enabled the group to take control over the 
centuryold smuggling networks reaching the Turkish and Iraqis territory, used by the regime to 
advance its regional policy (Kan, 2014, p. 73). By doing so, the ISIS could control the flow of 
weapons crossing Turkish and Iraqis checkpoints, and impose taxes on goods transported by 
the smugglers (Kan, 2014, p. 73). These networks will also be used to smuggle Oil or drugs. 
The very nature of this centuryold illegal activities makes it extremely difficult for a 
government (e.g. Turkey) to control it, can be compared to drugs smuggling in Europe or across 
the US-Mexican border, except for this case this traffic takes place in a war-torn area. 
The very structured organisation enabled it to rapidly take control over the population 
and co-opt other rival fighters with financial awards (Lister, 2014, p. 92). The territory under 
its control grew exponentially, and the organisation, despite some calls for not calling it a 
“state”, was able to establish itself as a functioning state. The only thing the organisation was 
missing for being called a state was international recognition. Indeed, the organisation was soon 
able to run administrations, create its own currency and print money, run schools and hospitals, 
maintain or build roads, water and electricity networks and collect taxes (Brisard & Martinez, 
2014, p. 10; Kan, 2014, p. 79; Fromson & Simon, 2015, p. 42). In its Dabiq Magazine, a 
propaganda magazine, it displays pictures of children being treated from cancer, elderly people 
being cared for, and streets being cleaned by its members. ISIS paid well its fighters and their 
families even when those fighters were captured or killed (FATF, 2015, p. 30), and a particular 
attention was given for paying them on time. The bureaucratic style of management also eased 
the flow of information to the top, best captured by the precise report containing hundreds of 
pages published annually in the so-called “Al-Naba” Newspaper. It includes statistics, numbers 
of people killed and reports on territorial and material gains. 
C. The FSA 
 In stark contrast with ISIS, the FSA consisted of loosely groups coordinating in 
some instance or even clashing in others. Harassed by the regime while the latter left ISIS 
operates quasi-freely in Northern parts and Eastern parts of the country, the FSA had to face 
the attacks of the ISIS, the Nusra Front, the SAA and its airpower. While the FSA fighters were 
able to win decisive battles against the regime, the FSA HQ in Turkey was not able to deliver 
the necessary weapons from Europe or the US, and to manage the areas controlled by the 
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opposition (Zuhur, 2015, p. 154; Holliday, 2012, p. 17). Its long distance from some battlefields 
impeded it from decisively support groups fighting or provide tactical guidance (Holliday, 
2012, p. 22). This raised some scepticism among rebels fighting in the battlefield over the HQ 
legitimacy. These rebels have accepted to place themselves under the FSA umbrella in the hope 
to get Western diplomatic, material and military support which did not concretise. By 2012, 
opposition fighters largely bought their own weapons consisting of small arms and light 
weapons bought locally or from arms smugglers (Herbert, 2014, p. 76). The ability of the rebels 
to buy weapons were critical to their success, and the pressure on the black market in Syria and 
surrounding countries, revealed by a surge in the price of weapons, suggested that the rebels 
did not have sufficient weapons (Holliday, 2012, p. 30). The funding of the revolution was 
largely dependent on donations by friendly governments, the Syrian diaspora and private 
individuals from middle-eastern countries (Herbert, 2014, p. 80).  
The growing extremist groups such as Al Nusra diverted those funds and impeded 
donations from supporting moderate groups (Herbert, 2014, p. 80). This led to a number of 
defections among FSA rebels to Al-Nusra and later to ISIS, attracted by their weapons, finance 
and well-structured organisation (Mahmood & Black, 2013). It is interesting to note the 
extensive display of weapons within Al Nusra’s video releases, even in non-battle related clips 
(ransom demand, claim of responsibility for a terror attack). A report published in 2015 shows 
that most of internal fighters joining Al Nusra or ISIS do so for “Status” and “revenge” (The 
White Papers, 2015, p. 10). The report concludes that “Islam” is not a determining factor in the 
enrolment of a Jihadist, but a “means to an end” (The White Papers, 2015, p. 3). In Syria, the 
means are weapons – provided by Jihadists – the end is the fall of the regime at best, or a sense 
of revenge at least. In 2013, the Regime’s use of chemical weapons shifted Obama’s policy, 
which allowed the CIA to support the opposition with weapons, giving birth to the CIA 
operation “Timber Sycamore” (Mazzetti & Younes, 2016). However, it seems that it did not 
produce the desired outcome. In June 2014 President Obama noted that the moderate opposition 
was made of “farmers or teachers or pharmacists” with no training (Obama, 2014). In fact, as 
noted above the opposition have benefited from the defections of the Syrian army soldiers, 
leading an activist group reporting on the deaths in the opposition ranks, to note than more than 
60% of the opposition members killed were former soldiers, in the wake of Obama’s comment 
(Kessler, 2014). As it will be discussed in the last chapter of this paper, the issues this operation 
has faced were more related to the way it has been organised rather than the rebels themselves. 
Obama’s comment nonetheless revealed his lack of commitment and scepticism about the 
opposition cause or their ability to present themselves as a serious alternative. 
The US finally intervened with air power in September 2014, striking very limited 
targets. Its targets consisted of ISIS and Al Nusra militants. The aviation faced a difficulty in 
identifying the targets on the ground, with 75% of the aircraft returning to the airbase fully 
loaded (Amalric, 2015). In turn, this revealed the lack of solid intelligence in ISIS operating 
areas. Targeting Al Nusra was opposed by the FSA leadership. Indeed, even if the FSA opposed 
the agenda of the Al Nusra group, it was seen as effective in their fight against the regime 
(Zuhur, 2015, p. 148). It was also critical of the US lack of coordination with the FSA in attacks 
on ISIS. (Zuhur, 2015, p. 148). 
When facing the rise of extremist groups in Syria, the US has done little but refusing to 
provide the opposition with the means to fight the regime and ISIS. This largely played in 
favour of ISIS which could easily spread to the northern part of Syria, by fighting the under-
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equipped opposition groups. It diverted the few resources those groups had on their fight against 
the regime. Furthermore, in addition to being better equipped, ISIS had the advantage of being 
ignored by the regime, which found more useful to have Jihadists as an opposition rather than 
human rightists. 
 
V. Analysis of the US Strategic Failure 
Obama has been elected to end wars, not to start new ones. This can sum up the main 
objectives of the administration’s policy. Nonetheless, the presidency of the US often requires 
it to act even when it does not want to. As a result, the Obama foreign policy has been oscillating 
between interventionism and retrenchment (Garfinkle, 2014, p. 269). 
A. Democratic Promotion 
It is rather regrettable that for reasons linked to errors made during the Libyan crisis in 
some instances, the Obama administration became impervious to the idea of democracy 
promotion, leaving Syria into an unstoppable descent to hell, with far-reaching consequences. 
The Arab spring throwing millions of people into the streets revealed tensions in the region, for 
once not acerbated by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Sunni-Shia rivalry or pro-
Western/anti-Western state rivalries, but by the growing gap between authoritarian regimes and 
their populations (Hashemi, 2012, p. 31). These populations were now turning to the west, 
seeking for assistance. But the US had its own agenda and priorities which impeded it to 
systematically answer favourably to their demands. As Obama was elected in reaction of 
George W Bush Policy which believed that democracy would stabilise Iraq, Obama was 
cautious with democracy promotion and sought to withdraw from the Middle East. The Western 
intervention in Libya which started 4 days after the beginning of the Syrian uprising, raised 
hopes within the Syrian opposition that the regime could only fall. The Libyan intervention 
might have created a “moral hazard” as explained by Kuperman’s theory, leading opposition 
groups to believe that the regime would not be unpunished and in turn fostering their will to 
mobilise against it (Kuperman, 2008, p. 51). It is too soon to establish whether this was in mind 
of senior officials who applied brakes on the administration support for democracy, future 
memories might provide more details.  
Nonetheless, the Cold War experience reveals that short-term gains by accommodating 
brutal dictators can backfire in the long run. Furthermore, at first, in Syria the people were only 
seeking minor reforms - compared to Libya, Tunisia, or Egypt where protestors were calling 
for leaders to step down, or the reforms Assad itself introduce during the “Damascus spring” 
(Lesch, 2013, p. 80) - such as the end of corruption, injustice, and the end of the exactions 
committed by the security apparatus (Kodmani, 2014, p. 53). The regime quickly answered 
with a disproportionate use of violence on peaceful protestors. This poses a challenge to the 
application of Kuperman’s theory to Syria: the escalation of the conflict into a full scale civil 
war was provoked by the regime, and not by the rebels. Some even pointed to the amateurism 
of the regime when addressing the first protests with such a degree of violence (which could 
only lead to more protests) (Luizard, 2015), which can be certainly explained by a wave of 
panic among security officials. Furthermore, the opposition was divided and lacked leadership, 
with many of its members outside of the country (Lesch, 2013, p. 84), therefore incapable of 
leading a revolution. This revolution was spontaneous, which implies the involvement of people 
at an individual level. Risking its life in the hope of obtaining humanitarian intervention is 
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unlikely in a leaderless and disorganised movement. It could be argued that the persistence of 
the conflict might be linked to the US intervention in Libya. However there are evidences 
pointing to a certain reluctance of the Obama administration toward an intervention since the 
very early stage of the Syrian uprising. 
B. The Change in Focus 
It would appear that the half-hearted US policy toward Libya was actually an exception 
within Obama FP view, and was made under the pressure of its allies. Combined with its Cairo 
Speech, Obama nonetheless sent the signal to the whole area that the US was still willing to act 
in the Middle East, while in fact it was not (Bahout, 2016, p. 88).  
 When Obama got into power, he sought to change the focus of the US foreign policy 
toward Asia (Hokayem & Wasser, 2014, p. 135; Allin, 2014, p. 168). This induced a radical 
change in the policy toward the war in Iraq, considered by Obama as a “war of choice” (Obama, 
2009) in contrast with the Afghanistan “war of necessity” (Struye de Swielande & Daelman, 
2015, p. 72) and more broadly toward the region. By doing so he putted an end to the legacy of 
the Carter doctrine toward the Middle East, which states that ‘an attempt by any outside force 
to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests 
of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force’ (Hokayem & Wasser, 2014, p. 137). He was convinced that US FP 
issues take its sources in a strategic overcommitment and military entanglement (Allin, 2014, 
p. 166). He did not become the president “in reaction” of the Bush policy in order to be elected, 
but he was elected because his views on American interventionism were in stark contrast with 
Bush’s ones, as shown by its previous speeches and declarations before declaring itself as a 
candidate for the US presidency (Lissa, 2011).  His convictions were strong enough to bias his 
assessment of the situation of the ground by rendering him blind, and have frustrated top-
advisers such as Hillary Clinton, Leon Panetta, Robert Gates, Petraeus, Nagata, or Robert Ford 
who would later resign with this major divergence as background (Bahout, 2016, p. 98; Struye 
de Swielande & Daelman, 2015, p. 73). Facing a growing instability in Iraq and Syria from 
2011 onward, the US administration didn’t budge until 2014. Neither the fall of Faludja or the 
fall of Mosul, the second biggest city in Iraq, in favour of ISIS will lead to a military 
intervention. Obama still believed that the ISIS was a second-class threat and kept the Syrian 
case low on its agenda (Struye de Swielande & Daelman, 2015, p. 73; Allin, 2014, p. 170). It 
is only the advance of ISIS toward Erbil and the beheading of the US citizen James Foley in 
August 2014 that will trigger a reaction. But this reaction will only consist of the use of air 
power. While for many analysts, the very nature of ISIS as a terrorist group requires much more 
than air power to defeat it, there was a continuous a strong opposition from POTUS with the 
idea of sending US troops on the ground. As a result, the idea of supporting rebels in Syria with 
weapons will find back its way to the President’s desk.  
In his view, it was the responsibility of regional state to deal with the situation in the 
area (Struye de Swielande & Daelman, 2015, p. 74). The idea was that the US only had to invest 
into pivotal states, such as Iran, Israel or Saudi Arabia, defuse tensions that might exist between 
them (the Iranian Deal, Israeli-Palestinian conflict) and rely on them to deal with security issues 
in the region (Struye de Swielande & Daelman, 2015, p. 75; Indyk, et al., 2012, p. 116). 
Retrospectively, this seems as a quasi-schizophrenic view: On the one hand, he was expecting 
the regional actors to take actions, but on the other would later complain about the way they 
have managed the situation as it did not play in favour of US interests, to finally introduce the 
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very policy that he opposed months before. It could be argued that it is the complacent Turkish 
borders combined with the Saudi Arabia’s lack of willingness to deal with the flow of its private 
citizens’ money going to Salafi groups in Iraq and Syria that impeded the success of US 
strategy. But the fact that he lacked leverage over those countries to coordinate them in order 
to shape a clear and unique strategy that would favour US interests is entirely related to its lack 
of commitment since the beginning of the crisis. Indeed, the Obama administration have 
reopened dialogue with Teheran but also Damascus, culminating with a full restoration of 
diplomatic ties with Syria in 2010, further exacerbating the shift in the balance of power toward 
Teheran (Hokayem & Wasser, 2014, p. 145). The anxiety among Gulf countries toward the 
American retrenchment, or at least ambiguity, pushed them to advance their own security 
agenda, with no authority to coordinate their policy at the regional level and by doing so ended 
up by sometimes being at odds with US interests (Hokayem & Wasser, 2014, p. 137). This 
closely resembles to the situation in Libya, where the President would take the back sit, thinking 
he had enough leverage over the driver. European allies did not act as the President had 
predicted, instead sought to secure their interests even if they were conflicting with American 
ones. While Obama expected the UK and France to commit themselves in the post-war 
reconstruction, France and the UK quickly withdrew from Libya leaving the ground for clashes 
between rival opposition groups, and to Jihadists (Lieber, 2016, p. 116). 
C. The Red Line 
The willingness of the US Foreign Policy to commit itself on the international stage is 
a determinant in the role International Institutions play in regulating international relations. The 
UN, the WTO, the ICJ or the WHO are the product of the post-WWII order largely constructed 
by the US (Lieber, 2016, p. 112). Most international agreements are not binding, and even when 
they are, they lack the means of enforcement. It would be rather naïve to believe that 
International Institutions have the means to run independently, while in fact they are entirely 
relying on the contribution of its member-states, and often rely on states as actors for the 
enforcement of international laws and norms. In other words, the US historic active 
participation is a necessity for the survival of these institutions because of the role it took since 
the WWII in shaping them, and the need of having a superpower maintaining their relevance 
through the use of soft and hard power (Lieber, 2016). In this sense, a US retrenchment would 
lead to the weakening of the International Institutions. The idea of a US retrenchment is best 
encapsulated by Obama’s red line. Obama itself recognises this issue when he stated: “What 
message will we send if a dictator can gas hundreds of children to death in plain sight and pay 
no price? What’s the purpose of the international system that we’ve built if a prohibition on the 
use of chemical weapons that has been agreed to by the governments of 98 percent of the 
world’s people and approved overwhelmingly by the Congress of the United States is not 
enforced?” (The White House, 2013). The failed attempt of the US to deter the Syrian regime 
to use chemical weapons by setting a “red line” over the use of WMDs is symptomatic of the 
lack of credibility of the administration (Sterner, 2014). Deterrence consists in persuading an 
adversary that the cost of a certain action would be higher than the cost of inaction (Sterner, 
2014). The intention of deterrence on the Syrian regime was made clear by the President itself 
as early on August 20, 2012: “We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other 
players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical 
weapons moving around or being utilised” (The White House, 2012). Few months later, 
evidence of use of chemical weapons by the regime was brought to light by France and the UK 
and confirmed by US intelligence services (Bentley, 2014, p. 1036).  
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The use of WMDs by the regime show that it did not find the threat credible, as it 
weighted that using poison gas would not cost more than refraining from doing so. Using sarin 
had some advantages. The first was that it sent the signal that the regime had no limits in the 
use of force to maintain itself in power. It was also a blow to the morale of the opposition. It 
forced the opposition into giving up, or to radicalise further which have often played in favour 
of the regime. Moreover, it pushed the US into a corner, where the administration could not 
hide behind its rhetoric anymore and was expected to act. It did not, and rather send a disastrous 
signal to the opposition groups. It is interesting to note that ISIS has been very active in using 
the inaction of the West when facing the regime’s use of WMD in its propaganda for new 
recruits. The following months the US declared that it would not intervene in Syria as it had 
reached a deal with Russia, giving birth to a wave of hundreds of pledges of allegiance to al 
Qaeda-affiliated groups (which will later become ISIS) (IISS ACD, 2015, p. September). 
D. Arming the Opposition 
The administration has been reluctant to provide weapons to the opposition until 2013. 
This reluctance can be explained by the Libyan experience but also by the souvenir of US 
weapons falling into Afghan fighters’ hands, with no possibility to retrieve them (Rugh, 2013, 
p. 149). The difficulty of the opposition to talk with one voice have cooled down the White 
House with the idea of providing lethal weapons to what appeared an unorganized movement. 
This was a real challenge for the rebels. First of all, if the administration had to arm the rebels, 
they had to make sure that the side they pick ends up as the winner. Failing this, the weapons 
provided could end up at best into the hands of the enemy, or at worst into the hands of Jihadist 
groups. This means that if the administration started to provide this kind of help, they would 
have to involve themselves in what could turn into a potentially endless conflict. Given the 
views of Obama on interventionism, the scepticism of the administration about this idea is not 
a surprise. Then, the postbellum period would require the rebels to hand over the weapons they 
gained for their fight against the regime in order to stabilise the country. With a divided 
opposition, those weapons risk instead to be used against rival groups or political currents 
within the opposition, as happened in Libya. The arrival of Al Qaeda in the Syrian Civil war 
comforted the administration with this view. As al Nusra was enlisted as a terrorist organisation 
by the US, it further complicated the transfer of weapons to the opposition for legal reasons 
(Rugh, 2013).  
If this explanation seems perfectly legitimate to justify the posture of the administration 
at that time, it completely crumbles when the fact that the administration did start to provide 
weapons in the wake of the 2013 chemical attacks is added to the equation. Indeed, after the 
chemical attacks the Administration decided to foster opposition groups by providing them with 
lethal material (Herbert, 2014, p. 76). But rather than providing weapons straight to the FSA, it 
flooded the black market with US weapons. Indeed, in order to maintain the option of 
deniability the US sought to transit its weapon by using intermediaries through neighbouring 
countries, which diverted those weapons to sell it on the black market (Mazzetti & Younes, 
2016). Furthermore, it appears that this program ran by the CIA was financed by Saudi Arabia, 
in exchange for a seat at the negotiation table (Mazzetti & Apuzzo, 2016). The degree of control 
the administration had on this program appear to be very limited. The administration seemed to 
be very cautious with the secrecy of the program, as supporting rebels with weapons to 
overthrow a foreign government posed serious issues under international laws and norms, but 
also because it did not want to upset Russia and Iran with whom the US was seeking a deal over 
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the Iranian nuclear program. Indeed, in Obama’s reasoning, if Iran was seeking the nuclear 
bomb it was as an insurance against regime change. Interfering with Iran’s key ally in the region 
– Syria – would have comforted Iran with its will to obtain the nuclear bomb, thus threatening 
Obama’s cherished Nuclear Deal (Smith, 2014, p. 21). 
The failure of the administration to provide the rebels with sufficient weapons until its 
mediocre attempt in 2013 which resulted in the loss of millions of dollars of weapons in the 
nature (and probably in the hand of ISIS) had impacted ISIS ability to recruit. Facing daily 
massacres, many Syrians sought justice or revenge. The US were absent as were International 
Institutions, while ISIS was respected (as it was feared), provided its militant with a structure 
in which they had access to weapons, ammunition, training, finance and other benefits (from 
sexual slaves, to new houses). It also provided its fighters with spiritual advice, helping them 
to cope with their loss. It then became easy for many, to put aside their initial “democratic 
ideal”, especially when its perceived biggest promoter (the US) left their family and friends 
being slaughtered without budging. Among fighters, frustrations about the lack of ammunition 
and weapons led them to pledge allegiance to the highest bidder, which at that time was often 
ISIS. Once the US started to invest in arming the rebels it was often too late, with an opposition 
wearied by 2 years of war and rivalries among different groups rendering difficult coordination. 
Furthermore, the administration required the rebels participating in their $500 Million train and 
equip program to only fight ISIS. By September 2015, it appeared that only 70 fighters have 
been trained and General Lloyd Austin testified that only four to five fighters were left fighting 
during its hearing by the Senate (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2015). The supply of 
weapons should have created leverage on the FSA to order its ranks, by using weapons and 
ammunition supply as a carrot. Along with training, the US should have created a force strong 
enough to pose a challenge on ISIS and put enough pressure on the regime to make more 
important concessions. The goal here is not to do a remake of 2012, but to assess Obama’s 
judgement. As a result, by 2016 the US was involved in Syria with air power, have supplied 
weapons to the handful rebels willing to join their training program and is involved in Iraq with 
air power but also troops on the ground (artillery). In Syria, there is still no prospect of an end 
of the Civil War, and betting on the disappearance of ISIS during the decade to come would 
seem foolish. Furthermore, the democratic opposition seems completely weakened to the point 
that it can be asked whether it does represent anything but themselves. It would appear that the 
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been killed in a Russian airstrike in June 2017 (McKernan, 
2017). The organisation’s structure has been imagined by its leaders to make sure no one is 
irreplaceable. If its death could be a serious blow to its militants’ morale, the organisation has 
the means to cope with this loss, to continue the fight in Syria and Iraq, and reinvent itself as 
an insurgent organisation if it loses the control over its territory. 
E. Overall Assessment of Obama’s Policy 
Obama’s FP toward Syria seemed at first to be characterised by its non-interventionism 
but also a careful attention to avoid offence to Russia and Iran. Since the beginning of its first 
mandate Obama engaged in a policy of overtures toward Russia, and sought to get a deal over 
the Iranian nuclear program, in order to be able to rely on “pivotal states” in the sense of 
Barnett’s Pentagon’s Map for the security of the region. Obama credited Russia for being “a 
help” in reaching a deal with Iran (Lieber, 2016, p. 94). This deal was considered by the 
administration as a cornerstone of its future legacy, and would have been part of a broader 
realignment of the US in the middle East, by lighting its involvement in the area (Smith, 2016). 
  
 
  
Back to Table of Contents 
Core text: 
How did Obama’s foreign policy encourage the rise of ISIS? 23  
There is little doubt that Iran brought the Syrian issue at the table of negotiations, which could 
in turn explain the lack of engagement of the administration in favour of the opposition. While 
some commentators rushed into stating that Obama did not have a strategy in Syria, this essay 
argues that the strategy adopted was a containment one, but was improperly executed. 
Containment policy takes its origin in the Cold War. At that time, the US was ready to support 
any forces who aligned with democratic principles as long as it played in its favour. Ideology 
played an important role in the Cold War, and as such the US launched numerous democracy 
promotion programs in order to promote Western Values against Soviet ones. When Obama 
faced a violent ideology, here radical Islamism, rather than trying to offer a serious alternative 
which could have aligned Syrians with Western values, it opted for denigrating their movement 
(which originally was inspired by human rights and self-determination) by expressing its 
scepticism. While pro-democratic forces could usually easily benefit from material support 
from the US during the cold-war, the rebels in Syria fighting for democracy found themselves 
with no other choice but to leave the battlefield in favour of extremist groups due to their lack 
of equipment. Evidence that this strategy has failed can be highlighted by several facts. First, 
rather than being contained to the Syrian Field, ISIS has spread to a numerous countries, first 
in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Nigeria and other parts of the world with groups 
pledging allegiance to the caliphate. The last worrying and notable development was ISIS 
impressive large-scale attack in the Philippines, which led them to take control over large 
portions of the city of Marawi in May 2017. Second, right after the deal reached with Russia 
and the regime, Damascus have used chemical weapons in the form of chlorine gas and barrel 
bombing on a daily basis. In April 2017 children were hit by a sarin attack, leading President 
Donald Trump to proceed to a strike on a regime military base, something its predecessor had 
finally opposed. While the relevance of the Trump’s action at this particular time can be 
questioned, a similar action by President Obama four years earlier could be seen as a game-
changer. 
VI. Conclusion 
As this essay started by establishing US objectives in the region, an assessment of the 
completion of those objectives can be now be done. First of all, the current Gulf crisis emerged 
against the background of the Syrian crisis, Riyadh accusing Doha of supporting “terrorist” 
groups in Syria. This could lead in the long term in a fall in the price of oils, which will increase 
tensions between Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and put an end to the actual regional weak 
equilibrium2. Europe is still facing difficulties to cope with the refugee crisis, which attained 
new records in 2016 with its main hotbeds being Iraq and Syria3. While the US is committed 
to the reduction of WMDs, as seen above it appears that the regime have used chemical weapons 
regularly, and recently, but more importantly it would appear that ISIS could be in possession 
of them4. Then, in October 2016, Russia advanced its interests by deploying S300s, S400s air 
defence system into Syria, putting in danger US planes operating in Syria, and reducing US 
military options in Syria. Syria has been emptied from a quarter of its population, and civilians 
are still killed under the regime’s bombing and sarin gas. The future of the Iranian deal is 
                                                          
2 http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-economie/une-longue-crise-du-golfe-affecterait-les-prix-des-
hydrocarbures-14-06-2017-7050201.php 
3 http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/65-millions-le-cruel-record-de-refugies-et-deplaces-en-
2016_1919154.html 
4 See my Bachelor’s dissertation 
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uncertain. Debates over responsibility to protect seems to be an already distant memory. 
Obama’s Foreign Policy resulted in the weakening of International Institutions. For sure, 
Obama cannot be alone taken responsible for the rise of American Isolationism, and the 
consequences it has on the world. But as President he should have shown leadership by trying 
to restrain this trend. Instead he encouraged it, primarily for what appears dogmatic motivations. 
If it is too soon to a:ssess Trump’s Foreign Policy, and such a thing would fall into the domain 
of speculation, the then candidate campaigned on the further US retrenchment.  
This essay sought to demonstrate how Obama failed to promote the US cherished 
democratic values, while it could have played into US hands. The late US reaction in both Iraq 
and Syria throws into question the territorial unity of the two countries with the question of the 
Kurdish Independence remaining open. The “Kurdistan” will likely remain at the core of 
tensions between the US, Turkey, Iraq and Syria that are likely to last. Obama succeeded in 
frustrating its key allies, and the successfulness of the pivot toward Asia remains to be shown, 
with tensions continuously increasing with China and a North Korea more threatening than 
prior its first mandate. While the diplomatic front quickly appeared to be a lost cause, the 
Obama administration has not contemplated the other options available. The secular armed 
resistance has almost disappeared and its successor stopped arming anti-Assad rebels in July 
2017, while ISIS is still operating in Syria and Iraq. There appears to be a clear US retrenchment 
from the Middle East, embodied by the Syrian case, and this paves the way for other research 
on American retrenchment under Obama in the world.  
 ISIS has been able to capitalise on the President’s hesitation. The failure of the 
administration to promote its democratic model in Syria with acts, rather than words, frustrated 
a young revolution. As their friends and families faced the worst imaginable massacres on a 
daily basis, resentment made the Islamist call far more attractive. While their brothers in arms 
were dying due to the shortage of ammunition and weaponry, the ISIS with its huge military 
resources stolen to the Iraqis forces or bought on the black markets gave the opportunity of an 
equal fight. The red line U-turn signalled to the Syrians that you can use the worst type of 
weapons on women and children with impunity. With no army to oppose it, ISIS was able to 
go all the way to Mosul and take over the city within few weeks. It is only the killing of an 
American citizen, James Foley that would trigger a reaction from the White house, compared 
to the thousands Syrians killed, further sending a disastrous message.
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